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In recent weeks, all around the country, parents dropped their children off
at college. They’re worrying about whether they’ll make friends, how they’ll do
in their classes, if they’ll be happy. And in the back of every parent’s mind,
they’re also worrying, “Will my daughter be alright?” They may not know the
statistics: that one in five women will be sexually assaulted during her college
career. One in five. And for transgender and bisexual women, it’s even worse:
one in four transgender students experience sexual assault in college. For bi-
sexual students, it’s one in three. They may not know those statistics, but
deep down, they know.
It’s inexcusable. It’s unacceptable. It has to stop.1
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a problem throughout America’s college campuses: the
grave mishandling of sexual assault investigations. In one study,
thirty percent of male college students “admitted they would commit
rape if they were sure they could get away with it. This figure jumped
to 58% when the wording of the question was changed from ‘commit
rape’ to ‘force a woman to have sex.’”2
A span of recent, highly publicized cases of college sexual assaults
has led to a national outrage, not just at the perpetrators of the as-
saults but at the criminal justice system and its participants, the uni-
versities and administrators, and the highly prevalent rape culture
that normalizes sexual violence.3 Many cases have sparked conversa-
tion around legislative change, such as the controversial Stanford sex-
ual assault case, where twenty-year-old, Olympic-hopeful swimmer
Brock Turner was released after serving half of his six-month jail sen-
tence4 for the rape of an unconscious Jane Doe behind a dumpster
after a fraternity party.5 The outrage after the lenient sentence of
Brock Turner led California policy makers to amend the state’s sexual
assault statutes, which previously created a legal loophole for offend-
ers whose victims were intoxicated or unconscious.6
1. Joe Biden (@joebiden), FACEBOOK (Sept. 7, 2017, 11:55 PM), https://www.facebook
.com/joebiden/posts/10154652583601104 [http://perma.unl.edu/ZL5H-8BA2].
2. Alana Prochuk, Rape Culture Is Real—And Yes, We’ve Had Enough, WOMEN
AGAINST VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.wavaw.ca/rape-
culture-is-real-and-yes-weve-had-enough [http://perma.unl.edu/PE4H-H8VB].
3. E.g., id.
4. Erik Ortiz, Brock Turner, Convicted of Sexual Assault, Set for Early Release—
What’s Next in Case?, NBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/
us-news/brock-turner-convicted-sexual-assault-set-early-release-what-s-n640366
[http://perma.unl.edu/XP3G-X9KG]. Brock Turner faced up to a fourteen-year
prison sentence for his conviction. Id.
5. Thomas Fuller, Court Papers Give Insight Into Stanford Sex Assault, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2016, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/brock-turner-stan-
ford-rape.html.
6. Since offenders convicted of rape of an intoxicated or unconscious victim techni-
cally did not use “force” under the statute, the offenders were given more lenient
sentences than those convicted of rape using additional physical force. Matt Ford,
How Brock Turner Changed California’s Rape Laws, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2016),
774 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:772
This debate reaches much further than states’ sexual assault stat-
utes and the criminal justice system, and has become an issue of what
universities should be doing, if anything, to protect their students.
Some argue that universities should leave these matters to the crimi-
nal justice system.7 But others are steadfast that administrative
processes are not only necessary to increase campus safety but are
required by law.8
College campuses provide a unique setting for sexual violence,
where it is common and even traditional to witness overt displays of
sexual violence.9 Students are exposed to conduct such as “rape
chants” by fraternity members shouting “No means yes, yes means
anal!”10 or banners displaying sayings like “she called you daddy for
18 yrs, now it’s our turn” and “Rowdy and fun. Hope your baby girl is
ready for a good time.”11
One in five women and one in sixteen men are sexually assaulted
while attending college.12 However, more than ninety percent of sex-
http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/10/california-law-brock-turner/50
2562 [http://perma.unl.edu/Y3F2-4L38].
7. See Samantha Harris, Law Enforcement Must Take the Lead in Campus Sexual
Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomforde-
bate/2014/08/12/doing-enough-to-prevent-rape-on-campus/law-enforcement-
must-take-the-lead-in-campus-sexual-assault-cases [http://perma.unl.edu/5B4H-
RXDQ].
8. See Holly Rider-Milkovich, Campuses Are the Best Places for Sexual Assault Ac-
countability, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2014/08/12/doing-enough-to-prevent-rape-on-campus/campuses-are-the-best-
places-for-sexual-assault-accountability [http://perma.unl.edu/2ERL-JY4G]. See
generally Lauren P. Schroeder, Comment, Cracks in the Ivory Tower: How the
Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act Can Protect Students from Sexual As-
sault, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1195 (2014).
9. “Sexual violence” refers to:
physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a per-
son is incapable of giving consent. . . . . A number of different acts fall
into the category of sexual violence, including rape, sexual assault, sex-
ual battery, sexual abuse, and sexual coercion. . . . All such acts of sexual
violence are forms of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX.
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TI-
TLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/DBH9-SH8N].
10. Andrew Bretz, Making an Impact?: Feminist Pedagogy and Rape Culture on Uni-
versity Campuses, 40 ENG. STUD. IN CAN. 17, 17 (2014); Tracy Clark-Flory, Yale
Fraternity Pledges Chant About Rape, SALON (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.salon
.com/2010/10/15/yale_fraternity_pledges_chant_about_rape [http://perma.unl
.edu/3XBW-ZTTC].
11. Tom McKay, These Disturbing “First Day of School” Banners Reveal Fraternity
Rape Culture at Its Worst, MIC (Aug. 24, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/124331/
these-disturbing-first-day-of-school-banners-reveal-fraternity-rape-culture-at-its-
worst#.8dapaUEHD [http://perma.unl.edu/RUD5-SD6Y].
12. NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESEARCH CTR., STATISTICS ABOUT SEXUAL VIOLENCE 2
(2015), http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_nsvrc_factsheet_med
ia-packet_statistics-about-sexual-violence_0.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/BST3-
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ual assault victims on college campuses do not report the assault,13
which is higher than the national average of between sixty-six and
seventy-four percent of sexual assaults going unreported.14 Nation-
ally, rape is one of the most underreported crimes.15 There are many
explanations for the low reporting rates of college sexual assaults,
with the most common being knowing the assailant, fear and shame,
uncertainty that there is sufficient evidence to prove the sexual as-
sault occurred, and fear the assailant will not be punished.16
The existence of rape culture on college campuses surpasses stu-
dent behaviors and seeps into universities’ response to sexual-violence
reports. A study at the University of Virginia revealed that since 1998,
“183 people ha[d] been expelled for honor-code violations like cheat-
ing, but none ha[d] been kicked out for sexual assault.”17 This illus-
AFAT]. Another study conducted by the Association of American Universities
surveyed 150,000 students at twenty-seven colleges and found that 27.2% of fe-
male college students had experienced some kind of unwanted sexual contact
since entering college. DAVID CANTOR ET AL., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLI-
MATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 80–81 (2015), https://
www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/%40%20Files/Climate%20Survey/AAU_Campus_
Climate_Survey_12_14_15.pdf [ https://perma.unl.edu/952J-ZLLW ]. Yet another
survey completed on more than 200,000 students from twenty-one different four-
year colleges found that twenty-five percent of the women had been sexually as-
saulted. Jessie Ford & Paula England, What Percent of College Women Are Sexu-
ally Assaulted in College?, CONTEXTS (Jan. 12, 2015), https://contexts.org/blog/
what-percent-of-college-women-are-sexually-assaulted-in-college [http://perma
.unl.edu/FQ9L-MNGQ]. It is important to note these statistics include victims of
different types of sexual assaults, including a forced kiss or unwanted touching.
See Christopher Krebs & Christine Lindquist, Setting the Record Straight on “1
in 5”, TIME (Dec. 15, 2014), http://time.com/3633903/campus-rape-1-in-5-sexual-
assault-setting-record-straight [http://perma.unl.edu/5PQ4-P3BJ].
13. BONNIE S. FISHER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF
COLLEGE WOMEN (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/182369.pdf [http://
perma.unl.edu/Q2ZL-8AHJ].
14. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: RE-
PORTING TO POLICE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION (2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/7T4R-MMSS].
15. W. David Allen, The Reporting and Underreporting of Rape, 73 S. ECON. J. 623,
623 (2007); see also JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & LYYN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2014 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cv14.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/W2Q6-A6KD] (finding that rape is one of the most
underreported crimes).
16. David DeMatteo et al., Sexual Assault on College Campuses: A 50-State Survey of
Criminal Sexual Assault Statutes and Their Relevance to Campus Sexual As-
sault, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 227, 228 (2015).
17. Eliza Gray, Fraternity Row, TIME, Dec. 15, 2014, at 44. A further look into the
University’s history showed that the school had never expelled a student for sex-
ual assault, even when the student admitted to the assault. Sarah Ganim, Be-
yond Rolling Stone Story: How Does UVA Handle Campus Sexual Assault?, CNN
(Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/06/us/uva-sexual-assault-investiga-
tion [http://perma.unl.edu/44H9-7CH6]. After the controversial Rolling Stone ar-
ticle A Rape on Campus was published in November 2014, the University of
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trates that universities might be more willing to discipline students if
a student plagiarizes a paper than if a student sexually assaults an-
other student. As of June 2016, 195 colleges were under investigation
by the U.S. Department of Education for how they handle sexual as-
sault reports.18
This Note focuses on the Northern District of California in Karasek
v. Regents of the University of California,19 its interpretation of Title
IX’s “deliberate indifference” standard, and the “further harassment”
requirement that some courts have imposed for Title IX sexual har-
assment claims.20 Part II provides a social and legal background of
Title IX and the possible remedies available to survivors21 of sexual
assault. Part II also provides what is required under the deliberate
indifference standard under which Title IX claims are analyzed. Part
III sets forth the facts behind Karasek v. Regents of the University of
California. Part IV argues that the Northern District of California cor-
rectly interpreted the further harassment requirement under the de-
liberate indifference standard in Karasek by taking into consideration
the purpose of Title IX. Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes that
even though the Northern District of California correctly interpreted
the further harassment requirement, universities should be held to
the standard set forth in the Dear Colleague Letter promulgated by
the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights as a matter of
public policy.
Virginia has implemented a zero-tolerance policy on sexual assault. Id. Rolling
Stone retracted the article after many discrepancies about the truth of the inci-
dent came to light and was also recently found liable for defamation for the arti-
cle. T. Rees Shapiro, Jury Finds Reporter, Rolling Stone Responsible for
Defaming U-Va. Dean with Gang Rape Story, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/jury-finds-reporter-rolling-stone-re-
sponsible-for-defaming-u-va-dean-with-gang-rape-story/2016/11/04/aaf407fa-
a1e8-11e6-a44d-cc2898cfab06_story.html [http://perma.unl.edu/ZY9F-K6S6].
18. Tyler Kingkade, There Are Far More Title IX Investigations of Colleges than Most
People Know, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/title-ix-investigations-sexual-harassment_us_575f4b0ee4b053d433061b3d
[http://perma.unl.edu/6PJF-C8K3].
19. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Karasek I), No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2015
WL 8527338 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015).
20. Title IX applies to any educational institution that receives federal funding. This
Note focuses on higher education institutions.
21. See Carol Mosley, The Language We Use: Victim and Survivor, WE END VIOLENCE
(June 4, 2013), http://www.weendviolence.com/blog/2013/06/04/the-language-we-
use-victim-and-survivor [http://perma.unl.edu/G7GE-P5W2]. The term “victim”
“contributes to a feeling of powerlessness for those who have been assaulted,”
while “survivor” exhibits the taking back of their life and moving on, which helps
“those who have been assaulted begin to regain the power that was taken from
them.” Id.
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II. UNDERSTANDING TITLE IX IN THE CONTEXT
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
Title IX is the federal act that prohibits gender discrimination in
education.22 Title IX was first passed in 1972 to address gender ine-
quality in educational programs. While many people only associate Ti-
tle IX with school-based athletics, Title IX broadly applies to all
educational programs or activities.23 Title IX has developed signifi-
cantly since 1972.
Title IX, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681, provides in relevant part that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.”24 Congress authorized an administrative
enforcement for Title IX, allowing federal departments or agencies to
promulgate rules, regulations, and orders to enforce § 1681.25 Compli-
ance with these rules, regulations, and orders “may be effected . . . by
any . . . means authorized by law,” including the termination of federal
funding.26 Title IX provides victims of sex discrimination with a pri-
vate right of action against recipients of federal education funding.27
Sexual harassment is a form of discrimination for the purposes of Title
IX.28
Title IX is “broadly worded,” and the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that discrimination “covers a wide range of intentional unequal treat-
ment; by using such a broad term, Congress gave the statute a broad
reach.”29 But, schools cannot be held vicariously liable for sexual dis-
crimination committed by teachers or other students.30
A. How Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
Advanced Title IX
The U.S. Supreme Court first held in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education that student-on-student sexual harassment can
amount to harassment under Title IX.31 But the Court limited its
holding so that a school may be liable for monetary damages under
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2012).
26. Id.
27. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
28. Courts analyze Title IX discrimination claims under the same legal framework as
Title VII employment discrimination claims. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty.
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64 (1986).
29. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 179 (2005).
30. Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).
31. 526 U.S. 629, 640, 646–47 (1999).
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Title IX “only for its own misconduct”; that is, the school may be liable
only when it “subjects” students to harassment.32 In Davis, a mother
brought a Title IX suit against the Board of Education based on the
continuous sexual harassment her fifth-grade daughter was subjected
to by a male student in the class.33 The other student consistently
made vulgar comments, touched her inappropriately, and displayed
sexually suggestive conduct toward the daughter.34 The mother and
the daughter continually reported the incidents to both the teacher
and the principal, but the student was never disciplined.35 The only
action taken by the school occurred three months after the harass-
ment began, when the school permitted her to change seats in the
classroom so she did not have to sit next to the other student.36 While
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint because student-on-student harassment did not provide for
a private cause of action under Title IX,37 the Supreme Court re-
versed, holding Title IX may provide a private right of action for stu-
dent-on-student harassment when the institution acts with deliberate
indifference to known acts of harassment.38
The Court delineated a standard for these types of Title IX claims.
Under the Davis standard, a plaintiff must satisfy five elements.
First, the school must have “exercise[d] substantial control over both
the harasser and the context in which the . . . harassment occur[ed].”39
Second, the plaintiff must have suffered harassment “that is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and de-
tracts from the [plaintiff’s] educational experience, that the [plaintiff
is] effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and op-
portunities.”40 Third, the school must have had “ ‘actual knowledge’ of
the harassment,” which is satisfied if a school official “who at a mini-
mum ha[d] authority to address the alleged discrimination and to in-
stitute corrective measures on the [school’s] behalf ha[d] actual
knowledge of [the] discrimination.”41 Fourth, the school must have ac-
ted with “deliberate indifference” to the harassment; that is, the
school’s “response to the harassment or lack thereof [was] clearly un-
reasonable in light of the known circumstances.”42 Fifth, the school’s
32. Id. at 640, 644.
33. Id. at 632.
34. Id. at 633–34.
35. Id. at 633–35.
36. Id. at 635.
37. Id. at 633.
38. Id. at 646–47.
39. Id. at 645.
40. Id. at 650.
41. Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998)).
42. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
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deliberate indifference must have “subject[ed] [the plaintiff] to harass-
ment”; that is, the school must have “ ‘cause[d] [the plaintiff] to un-
dergo’ harassment or ‘[made] [the plaintiff] liable or vulnerable’ to
it.”43
B. The Deliberate Indifference Standard Under Title IX and
How Courts Are Inconsistently Applying What Is
Required as “Further Harassment”
The deliberate indifference standard is an “exacting standard,”44
which requires showing the school was more than just lazy, negligent,
or careless.45 For student-on-student claims, the standard is even
higher—it is “exceedingly high.”46 It generally requires the school
make “an official decision . . . not to remedy” the discrimination47 or
completely “choose to ignore Title IX’s mandate.”48 The school’s re-
sponse must be “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circum-
stances” and must subject the student to further harassment.49
The further harassment requirement under the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard is a causation requirement, meaning the university’s
response was a factor in the cause of harm to the plaintiff.50 Courts,
however, have been inconsistent in determining the actual parame-
ters under the further harassment requirement.51 Some courts have
held that further harassment requires the victim be harassed or as-
saulted a second time, either by the perpetrator or a similarly situated
individual, before the school can be liable under Title IX.52 Under this
43. Id. at 644–45 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1415 (1996)); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277 (adopting the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard for Title IX harassment).
44. Lopez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(quoting Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2010)).
45. Oden v. N. Marianas Coll., 440 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006).
46. Stewart v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 711 F.3d 513, 519–20 (5th Cir.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 599 F. App’x 534 (5th Cir. 2013).
47. Oden, 440 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290).
48. Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999).
49. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648–49 (1999); see also Williams
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding
that Davis requires that the school’s deliberate indifference of the initial discrimi-
nation must subject the plaintiff to further discrimination), superseded by statute
on other grounds, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (amended 2009).
50. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Karasek I), No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2015
WL 8527338, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015).
51. Compare Ha v. Nw. Univ., No. 14 C 895, 2014 WL 5893292 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13,
2014) (subscribing to the idea that further harassment requires subsequent af-
firmative acts of harassment), with Williams, 477 F.3d 1282 (holding the univer-
sity acted with deliberate indifference when it failed to take precautions to
prevent future attacks).
52. See Ha, 2014 WL 5893292, at *2 (holding that the knowledge that assailant was
still on campus was not sufficient to support a Title IX claim as there were no
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view, courts will not find that universities have acted with deliberate
indifference as long as there have not been additional acts of harass-
ment by the perpetrator. In Frazer v. Temple University, the plaintiff
stated in her complaint that her assailant was permitted to remain on
campus, would follow her and sit outside her dormitory, followed her
to the cafeteria, and “stood directly beside her and stared at her while
she was having a conversation with another student.”53 The District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated that the assail-
ant’s conduct “can be viewed as that of a jilted boyfriend, [and] does
not amount to sexual harassment or harassment of any kind that is
sufficiently ‘severe, pervasive, and objectionably offensive’ for liability
to attach under Davis.”54
Similarly, in Ha v. Northwestern University, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois concluded that the survivor’s “occa-
sional glimpse” of her assailant was not sufficient further harassment
to support a Title IX claim, even though knowing he was on campus
caused her “considerable grief.”55 The District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee reached the same result in Thomas v. Meharry
Medical College.56 Because the survivor did not continue to experience
sexual violence after the school received notice, it did not amount to
deliberate indifference.57 This means a plaintiff cannot be successful if
there is no harassment after the institution received notice.58 This re-
quirement is not present in other types of claims which also use the
deliberate indifference standard.59
Other courts, such as the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, have rejected this theory and ruled against universities even
subsequent acts of harassment); see also Frazer v. Temple Univ., 25 F. Supp. 3d
598, 613–14 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (dismissing Title IX claim because plaintiff’s claim of
subsequent harassment was insufficient to be “severe, pervasive, and objectiona-
bly offensive”); Thomas v. Meharry Med. Coll., 1 F. Supp. 3d 816, 827 (M.D. Tenn.
2014) (concluding “there [was] no basis to find” deliberate indifference since there
were no allegations of sexual harassment or contact by the perpetrator following
the filing of plaintiff’s report).
53. 25 F. Supp. 3d at 614.
54. Id.
55. 2014 WL 5893292, at *2.
56. 1 F. Supp. 3d at 827.
57. Id.
58. See Frazer, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 613–14.
59. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989) (holding a municipality
may be liable when its “failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the con-
stitutional rights of its inhabitants”); see also Young v. Choinski, 15 F. Supp. 3d
172, 182 (D. Conn. 2014) (explaining the deliberate indifference standard under
Eighth Amendment claims for prisoner’s serious medical needs requires showing
the danger posed to the prisoner by the indifference was “sufficiently serious” and
the prison officials acted with “ ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety’
in failing to address [the] danger” (citations omitted)).
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without any subsequent contact between the victim and perpetrator.60
The Eleventh Circuit, in Williams v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity System of Georgia, analyzed the definition of “subject”61 to con-
clude that the University of Georgia’s actions were deliberately
indifferent which subjected the victim to further discrimination for the
purposes of Title IX.62 The court concluded the University acted with
deliberate indifference on three separate occasions:63 First, when the
University failed to inform its student athletes about its sexual har-
assment policy and failed to adequately supervise the actions of its
student athletes, which caused the plaintiff to be the victim of a con-
spiracy by three basketball players to sexually assault and rape her.64
Second, by failing to provide an adequate response to the plaintiff’s
complaint by waiting an additional eight months before conducting a
disciplinary hearing, even though the University Police had completed
a full report within three months.65 And, finally, the University acted
with deliberate indifference by “effectively denying [the plaintiff] an
opportunity to continue to attend [the university].”66 Even though the
plaintiff withdrew from the University immediately after the incident,
the University “failed to take any precautions that would prevent fu-
ture attacks,” such as removing the perpetrators from student hous-
60. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 172 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d
and remanded on other grounds, 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Williams v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2007), superseded by
statute on other grounds, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (amended 2009); Takla v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:15-cv-04418-CAS(SHx), 2015 WL 6755190, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 2015) (stating that even without “post-assault harassment by [the
assailant], the fact that he and plaintiff attended school together could be found
to constitute [sufficient harassment]”); Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d
438, 444 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding that “even absent actual post-assault harass-
ment” by the perpetrator, the school could be found to be deliberately indifferent);
Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003 WL 1653424, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar.
26, 2003) (holding on summary judgment that a reasonable jury could find the
university ignoring plaintiff’s repeated requests for different academic and resi-
dential accommodations rendered her “vulnerable” to further harassment by the
perpetrator).
61. 477 F.3d at 1296 (noting a definition of “subject” as “to cause to undergo the ac-
tion of something specified; expose’ or ‘to make liable or vulnerable; lay open;
expose” (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–45 (1999))).
62. Id. at 1296–97.
63. Id. But, it is important to note that the court described the facts in this case as
extreme. Id. at 1299.
64. Id. at 1296. Further, the University was aware that one of the basketball players
had a history of serious sexual misconduct but still recruited and admitted him.
Id. at 1297, 1299.
65. Id. at 1296–97. By the time the University conducted its disciplinary hearing, two
of the three perpetrators no longer attended the University. Id.
66. Id. at 1297.
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ing, suspending the assailants, or implementing a more protective
sexual harassment policy.67
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently reaffirmed in Hill v. Cundiff
that if a university’s response to a sexual assault claim is so ineffec-
tive it bars the victim’s access to educational opportunities, it can
amount to deliberate indifference.68 Under this approach, a univer-
sity’s failure to properly investigate a claim can be acknowledged as
deliberate indifference.69 Merely conducting a minimal investigation
to relieve the school of liability, however, is not sufficient.70
Further, other courts have held that a university’s conduct predat-
ing the assault can also amount to deliberate indifference.71 In Simp-
son v. University of Colorado Boulder, Simpson argued the recruiting
program for student athletes was so sexually charged leading up to
her assault, it constituted deliberate indifference by the university.72
Allegedly, the recruits would consistently be promised “a good time”
and paired with a female “Ambassador” to be their escort for the week-
end.73 All of this occurred with encouragement and involvement by
the football team’s head coach, even after several assaults were re-
ported.74 The court concluded that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the plaintiffs and denied the university’s motion for sum-
67. Id. But see Doe v. Bibb Cty. Sch. Dist., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1381–82 (M.D. Ga.
2015) (recognizing a funding recipient’s deficient response that bars a victim’s
educational opportunity or benefit can constitute “further discrimination,” but
that is not the case where the perpetrators did not return to the school, the victim
testified she did not want to return, and the “school altered its policies on student
supervision”).
68. 797 F.3d 948, 973–76 (11th Cir. 2015) (reversing the grant of summary judgment
to the school, reasoning that a jury could find that the school acted with deliber-
ate indifference with its “clearly unreasonable response” to the sexual assault).
69. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 700–01 (4th Cir. 2007).
70. See Vance v. Spencer Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 260–61 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating if the school’s argument that doing “something in response to harass-
ment” satisfied the deliberate indifference standard was accurate, the school
could get away with “merely investigating and absolutely nothing more”). The
court also concluded that continuing to use the same ineffective methods to re-
spond to claims can be viewed as deliberate indifference. Id. at 262.
71. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding a
university can be in clear violation of Title IX when it has an official policy that
fails to provide adequate training or guidance).
72. Id.; see also Allison Sherry, CU Settles Case Stemming from Recruit Scandal,
DENVER POST (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.denverpost.com/2007/12/05/cu-settles-
case-stemming-from-recruit-scandal [http://perma.unl.edu/H6UC-U77D] (report-
ing on the settlement).
73. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1180.
74. Id. at 1183–84 (“[The head coach] claimed that at schools all over the country
recruits were shown ‘a goodtime,’ met young women, and went to parties, and if
such activities weren’t allowed at CU, it would be a ‘competitive disadvantage’ for
the football team.”).
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mary judgment.75 The university then settled with the plaintiffs,
awarding $2.5 million to Simpson and $250,000 to the second plaintiff,
who was allegedly raped the same night as Simpson.76
Still, other courts have used varying lines of reasoning to conclude
that deliberate indifference does not require subsequent acts of har-
assment by the perpetrator. The District Court for the District of Con-
necticut held that a reasonable jury could find that Yale University
was deliberately indifferent after it ignored the plaintiff’s numerous
requests for different residential and academic accommodations,
which led her to withdraw from the university.77 The court reasoned
that even though plaintiff did not suffer further harassment by the
perpetrator, “it was her departure from her classes and her dormitory,
not any immediate action taken by [the university], that assured the
outcome.”78
Similarly, the same court held in another case that the brief sus-
pension of the perpetrator could suffice as evidence of the school’s de-
liberate indifference because after he returned to the school there was
“potential for emotional encounters and harassment.”79 A recent case
against the Regents of the University of California also subscribed to
this view.80 The District Court for the Central District of California
reasoned that “the phrase, ‘make liable and vulnerable’ would be re-
dundant if construed to require further harassment.”81 Placing such a
strong emphasis on the requirement for further harassment would
punish a victim who tries to avoid situations where she might encoun-
ter the perpetrator.82
III. KARASEK V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
Karasek involves the claims of three individuals against the Re-
gents of the University of California, specifically the University of Cal-
ifornia, Berkeley, under Title IX.83 All three individuals were sexually
assaulted while undergraduate students at the University.84 The
plaintiffs alleged the University responded with deliberate indiffer-
75. Id. at 1185.
76. Sherry, supra note 72.
77. Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003 WL 1653424, at *3–4 (D. Conn. Mar.
26, 2003).
78. Id. at *4.
79. Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447 (D. Conn. 2006).
80. Takla v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:15-cv-04418-CAS(SHx), 2015 WL
6755190, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015).
81. Id. at *4.
82. Id. at *5.
83. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Karasek I), No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2015
WL 8527338, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015).
84. Id.
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ence (1) after they reported their assaults and (2) to the general prob-
lem of sexual violence against its students.85
A. Karasek
Sofie Karasek was sexually assaulted on February 10, 2012, during
a weekend trip to San Diego with the Cal Berkeley Democrats Club.86
While sleeping in a bed with three other students, she awoke in the
middle of the night to find another student, referred to in plaintiffs’
complaint as “TH,” massaging her legs, back, and buttocks.87 Karasek
stated that she froze and TH “continued to inappropriately rub her for
approximately 30 minutes.”88
In April 2012,89 Karasek and three other students, who had also
been sexually assaulted by TH, met with three representatives from
the University’s Title IX Office, Gender Equity Resource Center, and
the Center for Student Conduct to report their assaults.90 Even
though Karasek was not informed at this meeting of the requirement
to submit a written statement of the assault to initiate a formal inves-
tigation, Karasek submitted a formal complaint on May 15, 2012.91
Karasek was not contacted by the University for the next eight
months.92 The President of the Democrats Club did tell Karasek that
“the administration had advised against removing TH from the Club
because [the administration was] concerned that if [TH] went to an-
other student group, he [could] assault someone and there would not
be the same support structure for a survivor in that group.”93
After being informed that TH was graduating in December 2012,
Karasek emailed Christine Ambrosio with the Gender Equity Re-
source Center in November 2012 to request an update on her com-
85. Id. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims based on this theory. The cases in sup-
port of this argument were distinguishable as they involved the schools having
prior knowledge about specific facts or perpetrators. The plaintiffs do not allege
the University had such knowledge here but rely on the University’s underreport-
ing of sexual violence and failure for many years to adequately respond to re-
ports. Even though the University’s response to the general problem of sexual
violence was “lacking in certain respects,” it is not enough to establish deliberate
indifference. Id. at *10.
86. Id. at *1.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. While Karasek initially stated the meeting was in April or May 2012, the third
amended complaint clarified the meeting took place on April 20, 2012. Karasek v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Karasek II), No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2016 WL
4036104, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016).
90. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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plaint.94 Ambrosio did not respond.95 Two weeks later, Karasek sent
another email to Ambrosio.96 Karasek was finally given information
from the University for the first time on December 12, 2012.97 She
received a three-sentence email from the Title IX Office that stated
the “matter had been explored and resolved using an early resolution
process.”98 It did not state what the outcome was.99 On December 17,
2012, three days after TH graduated, Karasek received an email stat-
ing the Center for Student Conduct found TH had violated the Cam-
pus Code of Student Conduct but did not state if there had been any
disciplinary actions taken against him.100 After filing a complaint
against the University under the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus
Security and Campus Crime Statistics Act, Karasek was finally in-
formed that TH had been placed on disciplinary probation and had
undergone some counseling measures.101
B. Commins
Nicoletta Commins was sexually assaulted in January 2012 in her
off-campus apartment by “John Doe 2.”102 Commins stated that John
Doe 2 performed oral sex on her, attempted to force her to perform
oral sex on him, and digitally penetrated her without her consent after
she invited him to her apartment.103 Commins reported the assault to
the Berkeley Police Department the next day.104 When the University
contacted her, she was told the University’s investigation could not
begin until the Berkeley Police Department concluded its investiga-
tion.105 Commins specifically requested to the Office of Student Con-
duct that the University begin its investigation immediately, but the
University did not acknowledge this request.106 At some point, the Of-
fice of Student Conduct contacted Commins and asked if she still
wanted to pursue an investigation; Commins stated that she did.107
The University did not contact Commins again until March 2013
when she received an email from the Office of Student Conduct in-
forming her that John Doe 2 had been suspended until Fall 2014.108
94. Id. at *2.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2012).
102. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *2.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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The email, however, was sent to an email Commins did not regularly
check and had not used to correspond with the University previously,
so she did not see it.109 In July 2013, Commins contacted the Office of
Student Conduct for an update and was informed that “John Doe 2
had been suspended, that he was required to complete a reflective
writing requirement, that he had been prohibited from contacting her,
and that he would be on disciplinary probation for the remainder of
his time at the University.”110 Commins was not informed of her right
to appeal any of the decisions.111
C. Butler
During the summer of 2012, Aryle Butler was working for the Uni-
versity as an assistant to Margot Higgins, a Ph.D. candidate con-
ducting research in Alaska.112 In Alaska, Butler lived in the Wrangell
Mountains Center.113 “John Doe” was on the Board of the Wrangell
Center, was a guest lecturer, and was, therefore, on campus fre-
quently during this time.114 In June 2012, Butler was in the dining
hall at the Wrangell Center when John Doe “approached her from be-
hind, pressed her up against a table, and inserted his hands into her
underwear and began massaging her genitals.”115 The next day, But-
ler reported the incident to Higgins, but did not name John Doe.116
Higgins responded by asking if the assailant was John Doe.117 Butler
confirmed it was but requested Higgins not say anything at that
time.118
Later in the summer, John Doe approached Butler in the library at
the Wrangell Center.119 He “moved her hair to one side and whispered
into her ear, ‘It’s so nice to have such a beautiful woman around,’”
patted her shoulder and then left.120 Butler reported this incident to
Higgins as well.121 A third incident occurred later that summer when
Butler was in the kitchen and John Doe approached her from behind,
pressed her against a counter, and rubbed her breasts underneath her
clothing.122 Butler immediately reported this to Higgins, who was
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *4.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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away from the Wrangell Center at the time but advised her to stay in
Higgins’s private cabin.123 At the end of the summer, Higgins told
Butler that she had spoken with John Doe and she believed he “really
gets it this time.”124
Butler reported the assaults to Ambrosio with the Gender Equity
Resource Center when she returned to the University, and Ambrosio
organized a meeting between Butler and Oldham with the Title IX
Office.125 At the meeting, Oldham repeatedly asked Butler if she ever
“affirmatively rebuffed any of John Doe’s advances” and asked how he
was “supposed to know his conduct was not welcome if she never af-
firmatively rebuffed him.”126 Oldham also warned Butler about the
consequences of falsely reporting sexual assaults.127
IV. THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CORRECTLY
INTERPRETED THE FURTHER HARASSMENT
REQUIREMENT OF TITLE IX CASES
At the hearing on the University’s motion to dismiss, the Univer-
sity argued that plaintiffs alleging a Title IX claim must have been
subjected to further harassment after they reported their assaults to a
school official for the school to be liable.128 The University claimed
there were “two avenues of causation” a plaintiff could allege under
Davis: either the institution’s conduct “directly caused the harass-
ment” or the “institution indirectly caused the harassment by creating
a vulnerability that allowed the harassment to take place.”129 The ad-
ditional harassment supposedly required would be an “affirmative act
of harassment by the original perpetrator or a similarly situated indi-
vidual.”130 Since the plaintiffs did not suffer further harassment after
reporting their assaults, according to the University, their Title IX
claims must fail.131
The district court in Karasek I, however, rejected the University’s
arguments.132 The court correctly concluded that the University’s ar-
gument was flawed. The University’s argument that a student must
be subjected to further harassment in order for the school to be lia-
ble—no matter the deficiency of the school’s response, the impact on
the victim, or the circumstances of the case—was mistaken.133 This
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *10.
129. Reply for Defendant at 8, Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338 (No. 15-cv-03717-WHO).
130. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *10.
131. Id. at *13.
132. Id. at *12.
133. Id.
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view “runs counter to the goals of Title IX”, and the court refused to
follow that logic.134 Instead, the court followed the view set forth in
Kelly, Takla, and Derby that further harassment can be met without
additional contact between the perpetrator and victim.135
The court in Karasek I, however, still dismissed two of the three
individual claims by plaintiffs. The court dismissed Karasek’s Title IX
claim for failing to adequately allege causation.136 Even though she
was not required to allege she suffered additional affirmative acts of
sexual harassment, the court reasoned this did not mean Karasek did
not have to show that the university made her liable or vulnerable to
the harassment.137 Even under Williams, a plaintiff must show some-
thing occurred after the school was put on notice of the harassment.138
The cases Karasek relied upon that had similar facts were distin-
guishable from this case because the other plaintiffs made specific al-
legations connecting their harassment and their assailants. The
plaintiffs in those cases took extreme measures to avoid seeing their
perpetrators when the schools acted with deliberate indifference and
failed to protect them, and they had fear and anxiety in response to
the possibility of seeing their perpetrators, coupled with encounters
with their perpetrators after reporting their assaults to the univer-
sity.139 In Williams, the plaintiff permanently withdrew from her uni-
versity following her assault.140 Even though Karasek did allege
psychological and emotional damages following the assault, her alle-
gations did not stem from the perpetrator being on campus.141 She
134. Id.
135. Id. at *13; see Takla v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:15-cv-04418-CAS(SHx),
2015 WL 6755190, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015); Doe v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 451
F. Supp. 2d 438, 444 (D. Conn. 2006); Kelly v. Yale Univ., No. 3:01-CV-1591, 2003
WL 1563424, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2003).
136. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *14.
137. Id. (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644 (1999)).
138. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007)
(plaintiff permanently withdrew the day after the assault), superseded by statute
on other grounds, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (amended 2009); Karasek I, 2015 WL
8527338, at *14; Takla, 2015 WL 6755190, at *2 (plaintiff feared going to campus
and running into the perpetrator); Derby Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d at 442
(plaintiff eventually transferred to a different school to avoid the chance of seeing
the perpetrator); Kelly, 2003 WL 563424, at *2 (when the school ignored her re-
quests for residential and academic accommodations, plaintiff eventually left out
of fear for her safety).
139. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *14; see Takla, 2015 WL 6755190; Derby Bd. of
Educ., 451 F. Supp. 2d 438.
140. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1289.
141. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *15. The court dismissed Karasek’s claim in the
third amended complaint for not adequately pleading deliberate indifference,
stating that while the University’s failure to keep in regular contact with her and
its use of an early resolution process was “a serious deficiency,” it did not amount
to deliberate indifference. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Karasek II),
No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2016 WL 4036104, at *14 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016).
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also did not allege that her “heightened sense of fear, anxiety, and
stress” was in response to the fear of seeing her perpetrator on campus
but instead stated it was in response to “knowing that there [were]
possible perpetrators in her classes that have not been removed by the
University.”142
The court dismissed Commins’s claim because she did not specifi-
cally state the amount of time that passed between her report and
when the University initiated or completed its investigation.143 As her
claim of deliberate indifference was focused on the University’s delay
in beginning its investigation of her assailant, the court could not de-
termine whether the University did act with deliberate indifference
without a specific timeframe.144
The court allowed Butler’s claim to move forward over the Univer-
sity’s arguments that Butler’s report failed to give the University ac-
tual knowledge or that the University did not have substantial control
over the harasser.145 The University did not rebut Butler’s claim of
deliberate indifference.146
Even though the Northern District of California dismissed two out
of three claims, it allowed the plaintiffs to amend and refile their com-
plaint.147 Karasek and Commins filed their amended complaint with
additional information in an attempt to cure its defects but were still
unsuccessful.148 The judge made it clear the University’s actions were
inexcusable but did not rise to the “exceedingly high” legal standard
required by deliberate indifference.149 The plaintiffs filed their fourth
amended complaint on September 1, 2016, and the University re-
sponded with another motion to dismiss.150 On December 22, 2016, for
the first time, the court dismissed Karasek and Commins’s claims
142. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *15.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *16
146. Id.
147. Id. at *15–16.
148. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Karasek II), No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2016
WL 4036104, at *15, *17 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2016).
149. Id. at *1 (“I agree with plaintiffs that the University bungled its responses to
their assaults. The University’s failure to communicate with plaintiffs in a mean-
ingful way prior to making its disciplinary decisions is a glaring deficiency in the
University’s process. As this Order outlines, there are others. And one wonders
what it takes to get expelled from the University if a conviction for felony assault
of a fellow student is not enough. But all of that said, the deliberate indifference
standard under Davis protects school administrations that do investigate and
remedy complaints, and judges are not permitted to substitute their views for
those of not clearly unreasonable administrators.”).
150. Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, Kara-
sek I, 2015 WL 8527338 (No. 15-cv-03717-WHO), https://cases.justia.com/federal/
district-courts/california/candce/3:2015cv03717/290311/96/0.pdf?ts=1482482401
[https://perma.unl.edu/8GAU-YZ67].
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without leave to amend.151 Butler’s claim, however, survived the Uni-
versity’s motions. The University filed its answer to her complaint on
January 11, 2017.152
The purpose of Title IX is to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
sex in any education program receiving federal funding. As the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California correctly noted, re-
quiring additional acts of harassment by the perpetrator or a similarly
situated individual against the survivor would frustrate the purpose
of Title IX. Requiring a survivor to be subjected to additional acts of
harassment after filing a complaint with a university effectively pun-
ishes a survivor who takes steps to avoid a situation where he or she
would be harassed.
What started out as a causation requirement to ensure universities
were not held vicariously liable for every act of harassment on the ba-
sis of sex has transformed into a shield for universities from liability
no matter how egregious their actions are in response to a sexual as-
sault claim. The requirement of further harassment alleviates any
duty on the university to properly address and respond to a survivor’s
complaint. Under this view, a university could ignore a survivor’s com-
plaint and, so long as the perpetrator did not harass the survivor
again, the university could not be held liable.
Frazer is an extreme example of what courts require when they
follow the view that necessitates additional acts of affirmative harass-
ment to satisfy further harassment.153 While some courts requiring
affirmative acts of further harassment would most likely deem the ac-
tions of the assailant in Frazer to be sufficient further harassment, the
outcome of this case illustrates how courts are circumventing the pur-
pose and intent behind Title IX.
The District Court for the Northern District of California correctly
concluded that a Title IX claim can be successful without harassment
taking place after the survivor notifies the university. This does not
mean that a university can be held strictly liable for any sexual as-
saults that are committed by its students. It merely recognizes there
are numerous ways a university can subject a student to further dis-
crimination during an investigation, or lack thereof, that could make
it liable under Title IX.
151. Id.
152. Defendant’s Answer to the Fourth Amended Complaint, Karasek I, 2015 WL
8527338 (No. 15-cv-03717-WHO).
153. Frazer v. Temple Univ., 25 F. Supp. 3d 598 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
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V. THE DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER AS AN APPROPRIATE
FUTURE REQUIREMENT
On April 4, 2011, the Department of Education Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) promulgated a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) on sexual
harassment for judicial notice.154 The DCL consisted of a set of guide-
lines to assist survivors, the accused, and universities in navigating
the Title IX procedures.155 Then-Vice President Joe Biden drafted the
letter and launched the “It’s On Us” awareness campaign in 2014 to
put an end to sexual assault on college campuses.156 The DCL was
motivated by “deeply troubling” statistics of sexual violence on college
campuses and was directed at “ensuring that all students feel safe in
their school, so that they have the opportunity to benefit fully from the
school’s programs and activities.”157 The DCL discusses Title IX and
“schools’ responsibility to take immediate and effective steps to end
sexual harassment and sexual violence.”158 The DCL stated that once
a school has notice, or reasonably should have notice about harass-
ment, “Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to elimi-
nate the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its
effects.”159 Further, school employees must be adequately trained to
report harassment to the appropriate school officials, who can respond
to the incident properly.160 The DCL also requires the school’s investi-
gation of the harassment be “prompt, thorough, and impartial.”161
The DCL specifically laid out certain grievance procedures that are
“critical to achieve compliance with Title IX”:162 schools must (1) give
notice to students of the grievance procedures, including where com-
plaints may be filed; (2) conduct an “[a]dequate, reliable, and impar-
154. Letter from Russlyn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to
Title IX Coordinators 1 (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter], http://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [http://perma.unl
.edu/RT2F-JLPY]. The DCL does not impose additional requirements to the cur-
rent law but “provides information and examples to inform recipients about how
the OCR evaluates whether covered entities are complying with their legal obli-
gations.” Id. at 1 n.1.
155. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Vice President Biden Announces New Admin-
istration Effort to Help Nation’s Schools Address Sexual Violence (April 4, 2011),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/vice-president-biden-announces-new-ad-
ministration-effort-help-nations-schools-ad [http://perma.unl.edu/XC27-3LQE].
156. Tanya Somander, President Obama Launches the “It’s On Us” Campaign to End
Sexual Assault on Campus, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 19, 2014), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/09/19/president-obama-launches-its-
us-campaign-end-sexual-assault-campus [http://perma.unl.edu/YRP6-AM84].
157. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 154, at 2.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 4.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 5. Also, mediation is never an appropriate resolution in sexual assault
cases.
162. Id. at 9. These requirements are listed in no particular order.
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tial investigation of complaints, including the opportunity for both
parties to present witnesses and other evidence”; (3) have
“[d]esignated and reasonably prompt time frames for the major stages
of the complaint process”; (4) provide notice to the parties of the out-
come of the complaint; and (5) provide assurances that the school will
take steps to prevent the recurrence of any harassment and to correct
its discriminatory effects.163
The DCL also requires schools use a preponderance of the evidence
standard—a “more likely than not standard.”164 The DCL based this
determination on the history of using the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard in all discrimination claims under statutes enforced by
the Office of Civil Rights.165 Using the same standard of proof in all
violations of civil rights laws provides for equitable resolutions.166
The plaintiffs in Karasek I argued the guidelines and procedures
set forth in the DCL apply to prove the University’s deliberate indif-
ference.167 But, as the court stated, the DCL specifically states its re-
quirements are “the standard for administrative enforcements of Title
IX and in court cases where plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief”
and does not set forth the “standard in private lawsuits for monetary
damages,”168 which remains deliberate indifference. The court further
reasoned that the guidance provided by the DCL was broader than the
“actual knowledge” standard under Davis.169 Under the guidelines in
the DCL, a school is obligated to take action if it “knows or reasonably
should know,”170 while under Davis, a school can only be liable if it
has actual knowledge.171 Further, under the DCL, a school must ad-
dress “harassment that creates a hostile environment”;172 however,
under Davis, a school is only liable for harassment that is so severe,
pervasive, and objectionably offensive that it deprived the student “of
access to the education opportunities or benefits provided by the
school.”173
A recent case before the District Court for the Western District of
Virginia saw another attempt at this argument by a plaintiff but was
163. Id.
164. Id. at 11.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Karasek I), No. 15-cv-03717-WHO, 2015
WL 8527338, at *39 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2015).
168. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 154, at 4 n.12.
169. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *39 (comparing “knows or reasonably should
know about . . . harassment” language in the DCL to “actual knowledge” required
under Davis).
170. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 154, at 4.
171. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *13.
172. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 154, at 4.
173. Karasek I, 2015 WL 8527338, at *13.
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also unsuccessful.174 Although the court did acknowledge that other
cases have used the DCL as a factor175 or a significant guidance docu-
ment to give weight to the determination of whether the school acted
with deliberate indifference,176 the court refused to consider the DCL
in its analysis.177
Conversely, alleged perpetrators have brought claims asserting
that because of the publicity sexual assault cases have recently re-
ceived, they have been victims of sex discrimination under Title IX. A
male student at Columbia University recently brought a Title IX claim
addressing the “backlash [the University] confronted because its
treatment of men accused of sexual assault was perceived by some to
be too lenient.”178 He alleged the University was therefore motivated
to counteract the negative publicity by “accept[ing] the female’s accu-
sation of sexual assault and reject[ing] the male’s claim of consent, so
as to show the student body and the public that the University is seri-
ous about protecting female students from sexual assault.”179 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the plaintiff’s complaint to go
forward and overruled the University’s motion to dismiss in July
2016.180 As this case has not yet been resolved, the stance the Second
Circuit will take on this use of Title IX can only be speculated to.
While the plaintiff’s argument may have merit, it could be difficult to
decipher the University’s motivations. Whether the University un-
fairly ruled against the plaintiff on a baseless claim by the female stu-
dent or the University’s ruling illustrates its enhanced approach to
174. Butters v. James Madison Univ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 745, 757 (W.D. Va. 2016).
175. Id. at 758; see Doe v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., No. 1:13-cv-428, 2015 WL 9906260,
at *10 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015) (“Although failure to comply with Title IX gui-
dance does not, on its own, constitute deliberate indifference, it is one considera-
tion.”); Bleiler v. Coll. of the Holy Cross, No. 11-cv-11541, 2013 WL 4714340, at *5
(D. Mass. Aug. 26, 2013) (noting that the guidance in the DCL “does not have
independent force of law but informs this Court’s evaluation of whether the Col-
lege’s procedures were ‘equitable’”); see also Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp.
3d 951, 969 (N.D. Okla. 2016) (concluding that failure to adhere to the best prac-
tices or the guidance set forth by the DCL does not necessarily mean the Univer-
sity’s response amounted to deliberate indifference), aff’d, 859 F.3d 1280 (10th
Cir. 2017).
176. See Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448, 462 & n.7, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing
to the DCL as a “significant guidance document” and using it to evaluate a col-
lege’s disciplinary proceedings).
177. Butters, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 757–58; see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. 15-cv-05779-RS, 2016 WL 2961984, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2016) (rejecting
plaintiff’s “misguided” argument that the court should defer to the DCL in decid-
ing whether a university’s actions amount to deliberate indifference).
178. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 831
F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding the male student adequately pleaded facts that
plausibly supported at least minimal inference of sex bias by the university and,
therefore, vacated and remanded the district court’s dismissal).
179. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 57–58.
180. Id. at 59.
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combat the seriousness of sexual violence can only be determined by
reviewing the University’s investigation. Undoubtedly, universities
finding alleged perpetrators guilty of any accused sexual violence irre-
spective of the evidence is not the appropriate solution.
On September 22, 2017, however, current Education Secretary
Betsy DeVos rescinded the DCL.181  Secretary Devos claimed that the
guidelines went “too far and created a system that treated the accused
[students] unfairly.”182  Secretary Devos’s main criticism of the DCL
was its requirement that universities use the preponderance of the
evidence standard and argues that it should be raised to a clear and
convincing evidence standard.183  Secretary DeVos has previously em-
phasized the need for due process for those “wrongly accused of as-
sault” and whose voices are often silenced.184 While the Trump
Administration has not yet enacted new rules to replace the DCL,
there has been concern about the changes to come from the controver-
sial Administration that has been criticized for its approach to and
comments about sexual assaults on college campuses.185
Although arguments are made to the contrary,186 the DCL pro-
poses a praiseworthy standard to which universities should be held.
Requiring universities to adhere to the procedures outlined in the
DCL would ensure consistent, adequate responses by university ad-
ministrators and result in safer campuses nationally.
The inconsistent interpretations as to requirements in a Title IX
sexual harassment claim against a university illustrate the need for a
181. Stephanie Saul, Betsy DeVos Reverses Obama-Era Policy on Campus Sexual As-
sault Investigations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2017, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/22/us/devos-colleges-sex-assault.html.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Susan Svrluga & Emma Brown, DeVos Decries “Failed System” on Campus Sex-
ual Assault, Vows to Replace It, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/09/07/protesters-gather-anticipating-de
vos-speech-on-campus-sexual-assault/?utm_term=.fc14250e91c1 [https://per
ma.unl.edu/LL29-HYNU].
185. For example, in July 2017, the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights
head received backlash and later apologized for stating that ninety percent of
sexual assault accusations on college campuses “fall into the category of ‘we were
both drunk,’ ‘we broke up, and six months later I found myself under a Title IX
investigation because she just decided that our last sleeping together was not
quite right.’” Katie Reilly, Education Dept. Civil Rights Head: 90% of Campus
Sexual Assaults Amount to “We Were Both Drunk,” TIME (July 13, 2017), http://
time.com/4855492/betsy-devos-candice-jackson-campus-sexual-assault-accusa
tions [https://perma.unl.edu/RAY4-Y8MS].
186. See Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why Universities
Should Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 915, 943 (2016) (ar-
guing the DCL is an invalid legislative rule which denies alleged perpetrators
due process and is effectively shaming universities into compliance by publishing
names of schools under investigation).
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uniform approach. A uniform approach to Title IX claims would not
only provide for consistency in its application in federal courts but
would provide consistent responses by universities to student reports
of sexual harassment. Having clear requirements explicitly set out for
responding to student reports would provide universities with infor-
mation on how to adequately address such reports. The inadequate
responses presently occurring show universities either do not have the
knowledge to enact proper procedures for responding to sexual harass-
ment claims or do not prioritize it highly enough to do it on their own.
Currently, administrators and investigators that handle Title IX pro-
ceedings are not required to have any training on how to interview
sexual assault survivors.187 This is one of the reasons many investiga-
tions or responses are often deficient. When administrators do not
have proper training on responding to victims of trauma, Title IX in-
vestigations can result in inaccurate or inconsistent victim state-
ments.188 This often leads to obstacles in prosecutions of Title IX
claims. Requiring universities to follow the procedures set forth in the
DCL, such as mandating proper training for Title IX administrators,
would ensure consistent, adequate responses by universities and re-
sult in safer campuses nationwide.
Mandating universities adhere to the DCL’s guidelines would also
allow courts to easily review a university’s response to complaints.
The DCL, for example, states that although the length of time re-
quired to investigate a complaint will vary depending on the complex-
ity of the investigation, a “typical investigation takes approximately
60 calendar days.”189 Firm guidelines such as this would allow a re-
viewing court to easily determine the appropriateness and sufficiency
of a university’s investigation.
The prevalence of sexual assault on college campuses demands a
response not merely to reflect an image that universities are serious
about protecting their students but that universities actually are seri-
ous. A university’s aim should not be to act with the minimum stan-
dard required to avoid liability but to take steps to create a safe
environment for its students. The Clery Act190 was a substantial step
forward in protecting college students from sexual violence by arming
them with knowledge. But an additional step is needed to further pro-
187. See Sara F. Dudley, Comment, Paved with Good Intentions: Title IX Campus Sex-
ual Assault Proceedings and the Creation of Admissible Victim Statements, 46
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 117, 118 (2016).
188. Id. (stating sexual assault survivors may falsify information when interviewed
due to the sensitive nature of the crime).
189. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 154, at 12.
190. The Clery Act (formerly the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act) was
passed in 1990 after the rape and murder of Jeanne Clery in her Lehigh Univer-
sity dorm room. This Act required colleges to disclose crime statistics on and near
their campuses. Schroeder, supra note 8, at 1212.
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tect students and ensure a university’s response to sexual harassment
claims is adequate.
Many scholars have criticized the DCL and the administrative ad-
judication of campus sexual assault.191 They argue that universities
are not competent to adjudicate these claims and that these investiga-
tions do not afford due process rights to the accused.192 They argue
that the criminal justice system should be the sole vehicle for prose-
cuting sexual violence claims. Further, they argue the preponderance
of the evidence standard unfairly punishes the accused since it is a
lower standard than the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Administrative adjudication, however, is a necessary practice for
campus sexual assault survivors for many reasons other than the le-
gal obligation imposed by Title IX. First, the criminal justice system
often fails survivors of sexual assault.193 Second, even when sexual
assaults are reported, a majority of the cases are not charged.194 Pro-
viding an additional avenue for victims to seek redress encourages re-
porting of sexual violence in the face of a criminal justice system that
is widely unsuccessful. In the rare occurrence that a sexual assault
case is prosecuted and brought to trial, only fourteen to eighteen per-
cent result in a conviction.195
Not only does administrative adjudication encourage reporting, it
also provides another tool to ensure students are held accountable for
their conduct. By doing this, campus safety is increased. This is so
even though it is argued that the punishment imposed on students by
universities is not effective since even under the best case scenario
when a student is expelled, the student is still in society and can con-
tinue to perpetrate sexual violence. While this may be accurate, the
same rings true when the student is not expelled. However, expelling
or otherwise disciplining a student perpetrator conveys that sexual vi-
olence is not condoned and will not be tolerated by universities.
191. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2014, at
SR1, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandling-rape
.html?_r=0.
192. Id.; see also Harris, supra note 7 (arguing that the criminal justice system should
be solely responsible for the handling of campus sexual assault cases because
universities are denying perpetrators due process, and since all a university is
able to do is expel the perpetrators, it is simply releasing them back into society).
193. See Michelle J. Anderson, Feature, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Re-
sistance to Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1959–62 (2016).
194. One recent study found that only 9.7% of cases sampled resulted in charges.
Megan A. Alderden & Sarah E. Ullman, Creating a More Complete and Current
Picture: Examining Police and Prosecutor Decision-Making When Processing Sex-
ual Assault Cases, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 525, 525, 540 (2012). There is
often not enough evidence to proceed with criminal charges. Id.
195. Rider-Milkovich, supra note 8.
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Lastly, the preponderance of the evidence standard is properly
used in Title IX sexual assault investigations. The university officials
are not deciding whether the accused is being sent to jail, punished
criminally, or denied liberty. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard
is a burden of proof reserved only for criminal trials. In Title IX inves-
tigations, the university officials are only determining whether the ac-
cused has violated school policies. The accused in Title IX
investigations are still afforded notice of the accusations and the right
to hearing. The preponderance of the evidence standard is therefore
appropriate in Title IX investigations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The District Court for the Northern District of California sets an
important precedent in recognizing that it is against Title IX’s pur-
pose to require multiple acts of harassment by the perpetrator in or-
der for a University to be liable, no matter what the university’s
response or lack thereof. It correctly points out that this requirement
directly contradicts the purpose behind Title IX. Although this prece-
dent is a significant step toward providing more adequate protection
and responses to campus sexual violence, the DCL would further this
goal.
Sexual violence on college campuses is a pervasive problem. Stu-
dents are not reporting sexual assaults out of fear that their univer-
sity will not provide them with justice. Further, this fear is not
unsubstantiated. The fact that students are rarely expelled for sexual
misconduct but regularly expelled for honor-code violations such as
cheating illustrates how universities prioritize their students’ safety.
Student victims of sexual assault are twelve percent more likely than
nonstudent victims not to report the incident.196 The reasons for not
reporting instances of sexual assault on campuses range from the lack
of a confidential reporting system to fearing that the perpetrator will
not be “sufficiently punished by the academic institution or criminal
justice system.”197 Even though universities are avoiding liability
under Title IX by responding to a claim, these minimal responses are
still not sufficient. A universal standard that explicitly outlines re-
quirements for responding to and handling sexual violence reports
would promote equitable procedures and resolutions by giving univer-
sities the tools necessary to combat this serious problem.
While the future remains uncertain with the forthcoming changes
to Title IX and campus sexual assault enforcement by the Trump ad-
ministration, our nation’s colleges need to reaffirm to survivors that
their safety is essential and will be protected. Absent a national policy
196. DeMatteo et al., supra note 16, at 228.
197. Id.
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advocating for survivors of sexual assault, the campaign will be left to
individual members of society to stand up for survivor voices. As Joe
Biden reflected after the Department of Education’s announcement on
September 7, 2017, rescinding the DCL is a grim misstep:
Today’s announcement . . . is a step in the wrong direction. The truth is,
although people don’t want to talk about the brutal reality of sexual assault,
especially when it occurs in our most cherished institutions, it is our reality,
and it must be faced head-on. And any change that weakens Title IX protec-
tions will be devastating.
Sexual assault is the ultimate abuse of power, and its pernicious presence
in our schools is unacceptable. Policies that do not treat this epidemic with the
utmost seriousness are an insult to the lives it has damaged and the survivors
who have worked so hard to make positive change. And sexual assault has
lasting effects on survivors: as many as one-third of rape victims may develop
post-traumatic stress disorder, and even more experience other long-term
physical and mental health effects. It is a life-altering tragedy.
I’m asking everyone who has a stake in this fight to step up. Students,
parents, faculty, alumni. Don’t just sit and watch. Speak up. Any rollback of
Title IX protections will hurt your classmates, your students, your friends,
your sisters. Make your views known. . . . Keep fighting. Tell this administra-
tion that we refuse to go backwards.198
198. Biden, supra note 1.
